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Debt Collection Practices: The Need for
Comprehensive Legislation
I. INTRODUCTION
In our consumer-oriented economy supported by credit cards,
easy-payment plans, and deferred payments, the buyer often en-
counters the problem of how to pay his debts while the seller faces
the problem of how to collect his money. Society has always sanc-
tioned the payment of just debts and has provided legal collection
machinery.' In fact, the creditor may have traditionally been the
favorite of the law. Only recently has the United States Supreme
Court recognized that time-honored practices such as confession of
judgment,' garnishment,3 and replevin4 may be violative of constitu-
tional guarantees of due process.
1. See, e.g., PA. R. Civ. P. 1251-79 (foreign debtor's attachment). These rules were re-
cently declared unconstitutional in Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976).
The court stated that its decision did not hold foreign attachment procedures unconstitu-
tional per se, but Pennsylvania was required to provide procedures consistent with fundamen-
tal fairness in the interests of both creditors and debtors. Id. at 1130. See PA. R. Civ. P. 3025-
49 (revival of judgment); id. 3101-49 (garnishment and attachment to enforce money judg-
ment).
2. See PA. R. Civ. P. 2950-76. In Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972), the Court held
that Pennsylvania's procedure for confession of judgment was not unconstitutional per se but
the Court recognized there could be an unconstitutional deprivation of due process if the
debtor did not knowingly waive his right to a hearing. See also Note, Swarb v. Lennox: The
Viability of Repeated Judicial Attacks on Confessions of Judgment in Pennsylvania, 34 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 103 (1972).
3. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment of
wages without notice to debtor and prior hearing held unconstitutional violation of due
process). See also Countryman, The Bill of Rights and the Bill Collector, 15 ARIZ. L. REv.
521 (1973); Kennedy, Due Process Limitations on Creditors' Remedies: Some Reflections on
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 19 AM. U.L. REv. 158 (1970).
4. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin proce-
dure held unconstitutional); Comment, Prejudgment Replevin and Self-Help Reposses-
sion-Creditor Remedies of the Past: A Constitutional Plan of Assault, 17 ST. Louis U.L.J.
127 (1972).
The Supreme Court has determined that replevin procedures are permissible, provided the
plaintiff demonstrates the need for prejudgment action, provides security, and the seizure is
followed by a prompt hearing. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). See, e.g., Catz & Robinson, Due
Process and Creditor's Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgia and
Beyond, 28 RuT. L. REv. 541 (1975). Pennsylvania's new replevin procedure appears to satisfy
these requirements. See PA. R. Civ. P. 1071-87.
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No one would seriously question the right of a creditor to repay-
ment of his loan. When a debtor defaults, the creditor has a legiti-
mate right to employ lawful remedies to protect his interests, and
may seek the assistance of a professional debt collector. The effi-
cient administration of justice encourages these private debt collec-
tion efforts to prevent the courts from becoming overburdened. Nev-
ertheless, collection measures should be conducted fairly and rea-
sonably. 5 This comment will be concerned with legal remedies for
the debtor when the creditor resorts to offensive, extrajudicial meth-
ods in his debt collection effort.
In the commercial arena, collection techniques range from
friendly coercion to blatant harassment, since it is profitable for
debt collectors to resort to any method which brings results., Fre-
quently, the easiest and most practical means available to the debt
collector is to harass the debtor until payment is made. Examples
of collection harassment include: the use of letters and forms resem-
bling legal notices and court orders; letters and phone calls threat-
ening legal action or the use of physical force; visits and phone calls
at inconvenient hours to the debtor, or his friends and relatives;
contacts with employers asking assistance in collecting the debt;
and impersonation of attorneys and legal officers. Harassment is
often employed because consumer-debtors are peculiarly vulnerable
to such tactics and because legal avenues may not practically be
available to the creditor.7 There are three main reasons why
harassment is prevalent.8 First, the borrower is usually ignorant of
his legal rights and fears the lender. Second, it is usually cheaper
to collect through these extralegal tactics than to employ the
proper legal channels; if the amounts borrowed are small, attor-
ney's fees and court costs might exceed the amount of indebted-
ness. Third, the lender may be charging usurious interest or violat-
5. See Comment, The Problem of Debt Collection in Pennsylvania: Who's Asking for
Deliverance?, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 69, 82-84 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Debt
Collection].
6. See 121 CONG. REC. 5404 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1975) (remarks of Representative Annunzio);
Summary of Hearings on Debt Collection Practices, National Commission on Consumer
Finance, 88 BANKING L.J. 291 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
7. Berger, The Bill Collector and The Law-A Special Tort, At Least for a While, 17
DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 329 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
8. Id. See also Birkhead, Collection Tactics of Illegal Lenders, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
78 (1941); Kelly, Legal Techniques for Combating Loan Sharks, 8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 88
(1941).
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ing other consumer protection directives, and runs the risk of
making the debt uncollectable, or subjecting himself to criminal
penalties if he utilizes legal processes.
How can the consumer-debtor who believes the creditor has acted
unfairly or unreasonably protect himself? The debtor could bring a
civil action in tort against the creditor,9 who might also be subject
to criminal penalties."0 However, after examining these traditional
remedies in Pennsylvania, it becomes clear that the alternatives
now available to the debtor are ineffective. Comprehensive, protec-
tive statutory measures are needed.
II. TRADITIONAL DEBTOR REMEDIES
The tort remedies which may be available to protect the harassed
debtor include abuse of process, defamation, invasion of privacy,
and infliction of mental distress." In addition, Pennsylvania's crim-
inal code contains two sections which may offer some protection:
section 5504 prohibits harassment by communication"2 and section
7311 prohibits certain collection agency practices." These remedies
will be examined in this section.
A. Abuse of Process
The tort of abuse of process evolved at common law to provide a
remedy where the legal process is properly invoked by the creditor,
but with an ulterior motive of obtaining a collateral advantage not
involved in the proceeding. There must be present a form of extor-
tion-the creditor's use of the legal process to induce negotiation,
rather than the issuance, or any formal use of the process by the
creditor, constitutes the tort available to the debtor. 4 Pennsylvania
9. See Berger, supra note 7; Greenfield, Coercive Collection Tactics-An Analysis of the
Interests and the Remedies, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Hurt, Debt Collection Torts, 67 W. VA. L.
REV. 201 (1965); Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80
YALE L.J. 1 (1970); Sheinfield, Current Trends in the Restriction of Creditors' Collection
Activities, 9 HOUSTON L. REV. 615 (1972); Comment, Effectively Regulating Extrajudicial
Collection of Debts, 20 MAINE L. REV. 261 (1968).
10. See Comment, Collection Capers: Liability for Debt Collection Practices, 24 U. CHI.
L. REV. 572 (1957).
11. See note 9 supra.
12. PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5504 (1973).
13. Id. § 7311.
14. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 121, at 856-57 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (Tent. Draft No.
1976
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has long recognized the action for abuse of process. 5 In the majority
of reported Pennsylvania cases involving the creditor-debtor rela-
tionship, the debtor brought an action for abuse of process against
a creditor who had enforced a valid confession of judgment clause"
or who had joined in filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition. 7
The courts have concluded the defendant creditor was not liable for
abuse of process because he was merely carrying out the legal pro-
cess to its authorized conclusion. Since the purpose of the original
action was to collect money, the creditor's action had not been
brought for an unlawful ulterior purpose.
As in any case where motive or intent is a factor, the plaintiff in
an abuse of process suit assumes a difficult burden of proof. His
success depends upon his ability to show that the defendant brought
the original action as a form of coercion or extortion. 8 Pennsylvania
courts seem more willing to believe that abuse of process occurred
where criminal prosecution was brought by the creditor in order to
recover a debt, 9 than where a civil action to enforce a judgment was
brought.20 However, even though criminal prosecutions are not to be
13, 1967); id. comment a. Abuse of process must be distinguished from malicious use of
process or malicious prosecution; in the latter actions, the original initiation of the action by
the creditor is unjustified and wrongful. Malicious use of process involves misuse of civil
actions; malicious prosecution refers to misuse of criminal sanctions. PROSSER, supra, §§ 119-
20, at 834-56. See Hughes v. Swinehart, 376 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Sachs v. Levy,
216 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
15. See, e.g., Psinakis v. Psinakis, 221 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1955); Simkins Indus., Inc. v.
Fuld & Co., 392 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Selas Corp. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 344 F. Supp.
357 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Morphy v. Shipley, 351 Pa. 425, 41 A.2d 671 (1945); Publix Drug Co. v.
Breyer Ice Cream Co., 347 Pa. 346, 32 A.2d 413 (1943); Garland v. Wilson, 289 Pa. 272, 137
A. 266 (1927); Renda v. Shoemaker, 88 York L.R. 148 (Pa. C.P. 1975); Badami v. Dimson,
95 Montg. 89 (Pa. C.P. 1972), aff'd, 226 Pa. Super. 75, 310 A.2d 298 (1973).
16. See, e.g., Baird v. Aluminum Seal Co., 250 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1957); Morphy v. Shipley,
351 Pa. 425, 41 A.2d 671 (1945); Publix Drug Co. v. Breyer Ice Cream Co., 347 Pa. 346, 32
A.2d 413 (1943); Casa Di Sardi, Inc. v. Alpha Motors, Inc., 227 Pa. Super. 415, 323 A.2d 288
(1974); Fenton Storage Co. v. Feinstein, 129 Pa. Super. 125, 195 A. 176 (1937); Scrignoli v.
Figner, 84 Dauph. 332 (Pa. C.P. 1965).
17. See, e.g., Dumont Television & Radio Corp. v. Franklin Elec. Co., 397 Pa. 274, 154
A.2d 585 (1959); Johnson v. Land Title Bank & Trust Co., 329 Pa. 241, 198 A. 23 (1938).
18. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 121, at 857.
19. Defendant creditor's demurrer was dismissed in the following cases: Sachs v. Levy,
216 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (charges of larceny by bailee and fraudulent conversion
brought to coerce payment of bill); West v. Lipsitz, 58 Lanc. L. Rev. 327 (Pa. C.P. 1963)
(prosecution for defrauding roominghouse keeper brought to collect another debt); Kohl v.
Stekervetz, 58 Lanc. L. Rev. 235 (Pa. C.P. 1962) (prosecution for fraudulent conversion of
automobile brought to harass plaintiff).
20. Courts readily dismiss an abuse of process action after execution of a cognovit clause.
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used by creditors for the purpose of collecting accounts,2 the debtor
plaintiff in an abuse of process action based on a criminal prosecu-
tion must prove that the criminal charges were brought by the credi-
tor with the sole intention to collect the debt. The scarcity of Penn-
sylviania cases in which a debtor has been successful in an action for
abuse of process suggests that the action is an ineffective remedy for
combating harassment of consumer-debtors.
B. Defamation
The torts of defamation involve communications which diminish
the esteem, respect, goodwill, or confidence enjoyed by the plaintiff
because of adverse, derogatory, or unpleasant feelings or opinions
formed against him.2" Theoretically, it is possible for a debtor to
bring an action against the creditor for either of the twin defamation
torts of libel or slander, where appropriate, alleging injury to reputa-
tion by the creditor's actions. A number of obstacles make the defa-
mation suit impractical. Illogical rules, poorly defined require-
ments, and the disharmony of court decisions concerning them,
make defamation complex and confusing. Moreover, the defenses of
qualified privilege and truth, recognized in defamation actions, mil-
itate against the defaulting debtor.2 These factors combine to ren-
der libel and slander actions unsuitable as avenues for recovery for
the consumer-debtor.
Pennsylvania cases do recognize that words injurious to the con-
See note 16 supra. Defendant creditor's demurrer was also sustained in the following cases:
Feeser v. Community Nat'l Bank, 13 Adams L.J. 91 (Pa. C.P. 1971) (defendant obtained
money judgment and then levied on writ of execution against goods in plaintiff's store);
Becker v. Peoples Thrift Corp., 60 Lanc. L. Rev. 403 (Pa. C.P. 1967) (defendant levied on
writ of execution against plaintiff's automobile despite mistaken identity). But cf. Mina v.
Melnick, 222 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Pa. 1963), aff 'd, 329 F.2d 648 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
840 (1964) (equity title action brought against plaintiff in order to collect mortgage money
and delay proposed sale of the property).
21. West v. Lipsitz, 58 Lanc. L. Rev. 327 (Pa. C.P. 1963), citing RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs §
682 (1939).
22. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 111, at 739; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (Tent.
Draft No. 20, 1974). See also Cosgrove Studio and Camera Shop, Inc. v. Pane, 408 Pa. 314,
182 A.2d 751 (1962); Burke v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 225 Pa. Super. 272, 302 A.2d 408
(1973); Althoff v. Baldwin, 59 Erie L.J. 170 (Pa. C.P. 1976).
23. See Hurt, Debt Collection Torts, 67 W. VA. L. REv. 201, 205 (1965). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1583 (1953); id. § 1584(a) (Supp. 1976). See also Keddie v. Pennsylvania State University,
412 F. Supp. 1264, 1276-77 (M.D. Pa. 1976); DeLuca v. Reader, 227 Pa. Super. 392, 400, 323
A.2d 309, 313 (1974).
1976
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duct of a business or profession are actionable per se; the imputation
of insolvency, financial embarrassment, unworthiness of credit, or
failure in business have been considered defamatory. 4 The mere
accusation that an individual has refused to pay a bill, however, is
not defamatory unless the individual's credit rating is connected to
his occupation. 25 Courts have come to the rescue of businesses
harmed by false credit reports,'2  but this does not help the
consumer-debtor if he is not engaged in a business which will be
affected by such false statements; 2 and, since the debtor does owe
money, an allegation of indebtedness is not the sort of statement a
defamation suit will remedy.28 The lack of success in Pennsylvania
24. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 573 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974); See also
Birl v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 402 Pa. 297, 167 A.2d 472 (1960); Sarkees v. Warner-West
Corp., 349 Pa. 365, 37 A.2d 544 (1944); Will v. Press Publishing Co., 309 Pa. 539, 164 A. 621
(1932); Miller v. Hubbard, 205 Pa. Super. 111, 207 A.2d 913 (1965); Village 2 v. Village 2
Homeowners' Ass'n, 25 Bucks 272 (Pa. C.P. 1974).
25. Eppolito v. Finell, 21 Bucks 372 (Pa. C.P. 1971) (informing debtor's employer that
debtor refused to pay balance of car repair bill not defamatory per se since continued employ-
ment not jeopardized); cf. Tomol v. Shroyer Publications, Inc., 33 Northumb. L.J. 87 (Pa.
C.P. 1961) (communication causing damage to one's reputation for veracity or honesty is
actionable per se, whether it tends to affect trade, business, or profession).
26. See, e.g., Altoona Clay Prods., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 419 (W.D.
Pa. 1965), rev'd, 367 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1966), on remand, 286 F. Supp. 899 (W.D. Pa. 1968),
vacated sub nom. Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. Pa. 1970), rev'd,
438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971) (loss in business due to erroneous
credit report); Hartman Co. v. Hyman, 87 Pa. Super. 358, aff'd, 287 Pa. 78, 134 A. 486 (1926)
(defendant liable for plaintiff's cessation of business while erroneously on credit "black list").
But cf. McDonald v. Lee, 246 Pa. 253, 92 A. 135 (1914) (medical association distributed list
of patients who were slow in paying medical bills).
27. Where plaintiff has been able to recover for a false credit report it has been because
the defendant has abused his qualified privilege to report. Pennsylvania has long recognized
that a statement "relating to a subject in which the person making the communication is
interested or in regard to which he has a social or moral duty, when made to one having a
like interest or duty," is conditionally privileged. Williams v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.,
337 Pa. 17, 19-20, 10 A.2d 8, 9 (1940), citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 595(1) (1938). See also
Harbridge v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1059 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Rankin v. Phillippe,
206 Pa. Super. 27, 211 A.2d 56 (1965).
This privilege has been specifically applied to credit reporting agencies; the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the privilege was abused. Baird v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 446 Pa. 266, 285
A.2d 166 (1971). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1584(a) (Supp. 1976); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 595, comment g (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974); Ullman, Liability of Credit
Bureaus after Fair Credit Reporting Act: The Need for Further Reform, 17 VILL. L. REv. 44
(1971); Note, Tort Liability of Credit Investigating Agencies, 31 TEMP. L.Q. 50 (1957).
28. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 116, at 796; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 582 (Tent.
Draft No. 21, 1975). See, e.g., Fram v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. Pa. 1974);
Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971); Schonek v. WJAC, Inc.,
436 Pa. 78, 258 A.2d 504 (1969).
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cases where a consumer-debtor has brought a defamation action
against the creditor supports the conclusion that it is an ineffective
remedy for harassment.29
C. Invasion of Privacy
A right of privacy was not acknowledged at common law, but it
has had a rapid development in the twentieth century.3 1 Commenta-
tors recognize invasion of privacy as a combination of four separate
torts:31 intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness,
publicity given to private life, and publicity placing a person in false
light a.3  A key element in a cause of action under any of the four
categories is a wrongful intrusion on a person's activities which
causes mental suffering, shame, or humiliation in a person of ordi-
nary sensibilities. 33 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recog-
29. The requirement that the plaintiff prove that the defendant made the statement
maliciously or negligently is, perhaps, partly responsible for this unsuccessful result. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1583 (1953). It is uncertain what effect Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448 (1976), and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), will have on Pennsylvania
law regarding defamation.
30. A law review article is credited with being the impetus for recognition of the right to
privacy. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAv. L. REv. 193 (1890). See also
Comment, Torts-Right of Privacy-Unreasonable Debt Collection Methods, 2 VILL. L. REv.
238 (1957). There is some disagreement concerning the source of the privacy right in the
Constitution. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (fourteenth amendment); Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (first amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(fourth and fifth amendments); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring) ("penumbras" of the Bill of Rights). See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976) (reputation alone does not implicate any liberty or property interests sufficient to
invoke the procedural protections of due process clause). See generally Clark, Constitutional
Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 VILL. L. REv. 833 (1974); Comment, The
Constitutional Right of Privacy: An Examination, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 263 (1974).
The Supreme Court does recognize the constitutional power of the states to allow private
actions for invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart,
J., concurring). Recently, the Court reemphasized that private parties who unjustifiably
intrude on another's privacy may be sued. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
489-92 (1975). See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). See also Bloustein,
The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUT.
L. REV. 41 (1974).
31. E.g., PROSSER, supra note 14, § 117, at 804; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-
E (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-E (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
33. Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 532, 154 A.2d 422, 425 (1959). Accord,
Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951); Jenkins v. Dell Publishing
Co., 143 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd, 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357
U.S. 921 (1958); Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956).
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nized the right of privacy,34 but its parameters are not clearly deline-
ated."5 In recent cases, Pennsylvania has adopted the combination
tort discussed above."6 The plaintiff must show that the defendant
caused him to be subjected to publicity which is highly offensive to
a reasonable man.
37
In the creditor-debtor relationship, a common form of conduct
giving rise to a possible action for invasion of privacy is the credi-
tor's notification to an employer that the employee has not paid a
debt.3 8 Based on section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,39 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Vogel v. W. T. Grant
Co.,4" recognized that such conduct might justify an action; how-
ever, the court required the plaintiff to demonstrate that
unreasonable publicity had been given to a private fact.4' Applying
this test, if there is insufficient publicity, or if the fact publicized is
not a private one, no actionable invasion of privacy would exist.42
Thus, the supreme court rejected the trial court's conclusion in
34. The first case apparently recognizing the right of privacy in Pennsylvania was Waring
v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937) (performer has property
right in and control of reproduction of his performances, whether original compositions or
interpretations of another's works). But see Schnabel v. Meredith, 378 Pa. 609, 614, 107 A.2d
860, 863 (1954) (questioned whether privacy right existed in Pennsylvania).
35. See, e.g., Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 327 A.2d 133 (1974) (recovery denied
to plaintiffs who claimed creditor's communications with employers and relatives were inva-
sions of privacy). See notes 40-49 and accompanying text infra. See also Marks v. Bell Tel.
Co., 460 Pa. 73, 331 A.2d 424 (1975) (company's practice of recording all incoming and
outgoing calls of police department not an invasion of privacy since no evidence that tapes
were replayed). Bennet v. Norban, 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959) (search of pockets and
purse of woman by manager after she left store an invasion of privacy since it suggested she
was a felon).
36. See, e.g., Marks v. Bell Tel. Co., 460 Pa. 73, 331 A.2d 424 (1975). See also Neff v.
Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652D-E (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
38. See Note, Torts-Liability of Creditor for Contacting Employer of Debtor as a Collec-
tion Method, 24 LA. L. REV. 953 (1964); Note, The Debtor & Creditor Dilemma: When Does
a Creditor's Communication With a Debtor's Employer Result in an Actionable Invasion of
Privacy?, 10 TULSA L.J. 231 (1974).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967) provides: "One
who gives publicity to matters concerning the private life of another, of a kind highly offensive
to a reasonable man, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(b) (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975) adds that the matter
publicized must be of a kind which is "not of legitimate concern to the public."
40. 458 Pa. 124, 327 A.2d 133 (1974).
41. Id. at 131, 327 A.2d at 137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, comments
b-d (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
42. 458 Pa. at 131, 327 A.2d at 137. See, PROSSER, supra note 14, § 117, at 810.
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Vogel" that by sending form letters to the employers of the debtor
plaintiffs," and by telephoning their relatives,'5 the defendant com-
pany invaded plaintiffs' privacy. The court denied the lower court's
order for injunctive relief on the ground that notification to a few
third parties was not sufficient publicity to satisfy its test."6 Al-
though the court did not determine how many outside parties must
be notified to make the creditor's disclosures an actionable publica-
tion, it did suggest that the publicity must bring the matter to the
attention of the public at large, or to so many persons that the
matter is certain to become one of public knowledge;' a mere notifi-
cation or communication to an employer is not enough,'8 nor would
a few contacts with the debtor's relatives or neighbors be sufficient.'
The court apparently believes that such "friendly coercion" is a
reasonable means of expediting payment.
Even if the plaintiff can meet Vogel's requirements for publicity,
under section 652D of the Second Restatement he must also prove
that the creditor's actions were unreasonable. 0 The supreme court's
adoption of an analysis of invasion of privacy based on the Second
Restatement suggests that a harassed debtor might also be able to
bring an action under section 652B for intrusion upon seclusion, or
43. Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 121 Pitt. L.J. 137 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. 1972). The trial court
relied on the definition of invasion of privacy found in RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939):
"A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his
affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other." Since
the creditor company was aware of the debtors' whereabouts, the trial court concluded that
calls and letters to the plaintiffs' employers and relatives were impermissible interferences
with their privacy, and enjoined the company from such activity. Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co.,
supra at 138.
44. The letters read in part: "Will you please request the above named employee to call
at once concerning a matter of importance with which he/she is already acquainted." There
was no actual reference to indebtedness in the letter. 458 Pa. at 127 n.6, 327 A.2d at 135 n.6.
45. There was no allegation that any of the calls were offensive or made at inconvenient
times. Id. at 128, 327 A.2d at 135.
46. Id. at 133, 327 A.2d at 138.
47. Id. at 131-33, 327 A.2d at 137-38.
48. Id. See also Turner v. Government Employee's Fin. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 181 (W.D.
Pa. 1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1973) (notice to an employer of employee's delinquency
in installment loan payments represents reasonable effort to collect a debt, especially where
no evidence exists of harassment, oppression, or malice).
49. 458 Pa. at 132, 327 A.2d at 137. See also Lutz v. Brookline Sav. & Trust Co., 117 Pitt.
L.J. 239 (Pa. C.P. Allegh. Co. 1969) (threat of a sheriff's sale, overheard by one neighbor, not
unreasonable invasion of privacy). But cf. Montgomery Ward v. Larragoite, 81 N.M. 383, 467
P.2d 399 (1970) (call to mother and two brothers of debtor actionable). See note 54 infra.
50. 458 Pa. at 132, 327 A.2d at 137.
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under section 652h for publicity placing a person in a false light;'
and these sections, like section 652D, require conduct to be "highly
offensive to a reasonable man."5 Thus, the plaintiff who meets the
initial publicity requirements in a privacy action still has the heavy
burden of proving unreasonableness. In light of these problems, de-
spite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's acceptance of the Second
Restatement view,53 it is premature to conclude that privacy actions
provide an effective remedy for the harassed debtor.5
D. Infliction of Mental Distress
The tort of intentional infliction of mental distress is also a rap-
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, E (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967) provide:
§ 652B. Intrusion upon Seclusion
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclu-
sion of another, or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be hihhly [sic] offensive to a reason-
able man.
§ 652E. Publicity Placing a Person in False Light
One who gives to another publicity which places him before the public in a false light
of a kind highly offensive to a reasonable man, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy.
A more recent draft of the Second Restatement adds that the actor must have had knowledge
of the falsity, or acted in reckless disregard of the truth, for liability to result under § 652E.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
52. See notes 39 & 51 supra. This standard sharply contrasts with RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 867 (1939), which required only unreasonable interference. For the text of § 867 see note 43
supra.
53. In light of recent Supreme Court holdings discussed in note 30 supra, the American
Law Institute has modified the requirements for actionable invasion of privacy. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Preliminary Note at 86-87 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
54. While no Pennsylvania case has been found where publication of a debt has been
deemed an unreasonable invasion of privacy, there are existing examples from other jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962)
(creditor removed tires and tubes from debtor's car); Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala.
174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961) (creditor's agent called employer and relatives of debtor, alleging
an extramarital affair); Rugg v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170, 476 P.2d 753 (1970) (calls and letters
to debtor and letter to employer); Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100
S.E.2d 881 (1957) (letter sent to employer); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967
(1927) (sign in window proclaimed debtor refused to pay bill); Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola,
265 Md. 43, 288 A.2d 114 (1972) (phone calls over 5 month period); Biederman's of Spring-
field, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959) (creditor followed debtor and addressed him
with loud threats and offensive remarks); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340
(1956) (phone calls to home and school where debtor taught); Tollefson v. Price, 247 Ore. 398,
430 P.2d 990 (1967) (published notice in trade and local paper that creditor would sell notes
and accounts to highest bidder); Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 216 P.2d 571
(1950) (call made to debtor at neighbor's home late at night).
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idly evolving concept.55 The current trend is to allow recovery for
conduct that exceeds the bounds tolerated by decent society and
which is intended by the tort-feasor to cause serious mental dis-
turbance.5" Recovery for intentionally inflicted injury, even without
accompanying physical impact, has been approved." While inflic-
tion of mental distress might give the seriously aggrieved debtor a
potential cause of action, he faces the same problem as in an action
for invasion of privacy 5 -he must be able to show that the debtor
acted in an outrageous manner. Two factors are helpful to the
debtor in developing his suit. First, the extreme and outrageous
nature of the conduct can arise not so much from what is done, as
from the defendant's abuse of some relation or position which gives
him actual or apparent power to harm the plaintiff.59 Liability can
also rest on a prolonged course of harassing conduct rather than an
isolated event. 0
Pennsylvania originally required the plaintiff attempting to re-
cover for emotional distress to also prove some physical injury."
Although Pennsylvania courts now permit recovery for serious men-
tal or emotional distress directly caused by defendant's intentional
and wanton acts,62 no Pennsylvania case which has allowed such an
55. See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HAuv. L.
REV. 1033 (1936); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH.
L. REV. 874 (1939); Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REv.
63 (1950); Comment, An Independent Tort Action for Mental Suffering and Emotional
Distress, 7 DRAKE L. REV. 53 (1957); Comment, Extension of Recognition of Intentional
Infliction of Mental Suffering as an Independent Tort, 33 U. DET. L.J. 49 (1955).
56. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 12, at 56; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); id.
comment d.
57. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965), which states:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if
bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
58. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
59. See PROSSER, supra note 14, § 12, at 56; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965);
id. comment e.
60. See PROSSER, supra note 14, § 12, at 57.
61. Cucinotti v. Ortmann, 399 Pa. 26, 159 A.2d 216 (1960), reaffirmed the impact rule
that there can be no recovery for unintentional injuries resulting from fright, nervous shock,
or emotional distress, unless they are accompanied by physical injury or physical impact. See
note 62 infra.
62. Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970), overturned the impact rule,
at least where the plaintiff was in personal danger of physical impact and actually did fear
the physical impact. In Papieves v. Kelly, 437 Pa. 373,378, 263 A.2d 118, 121 (1970), the court
allowed recovery for "intentional, outrageous or wanton conduct which is peculiarly calcu-
lated to cause. . . serious mental or emotional distress." Since Papieves, recovery for mental
1976
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action in the debtor-collector situation was discovered.A
E. Criminal Sanctions
There are criminal statutes in Pennsylvania that arguably offer
some protection to the harassed debtor, but these also appear to be
ineffective.
1. Harassment by Communication or Address
Section 5504 of Pennsylvania's criminal code 4 makes certain
distress has been recognized. See, e.g., Kahle v. Glosser Bros., 462 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1972)
(wrongful death suit); Frankel v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 361 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(survival action where evidence showed decedent had actually feared physical impact of auto
collision); Reist v. Manwiller, 231 Pa. Super. 444, 332 A.2d 518 (1974) (suit for loss of consor-
tium); Bland v. Bland, 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 44 (C.P. Franklin Co. 1970) (father hid daughter
from mother who had been awarded custody).
For discussion of the evolution of rules for recovery for mental pain and suffering in Penn-
sylvania tort actions since Niederman and Papieves see Benjamin v. Global Collection
Agency, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d 56 (C.P. Del. Co. 1974).
63. However, in Anderson v. G.A.C. Consumer Discount Co., 53 Pa. D. & C.2d 464 (C.P.
Lack. Co. 1971), the court overruled the defendant's preliminary objections and permitted a
survival action based on abusive collection efforts aimed at a decedent to collect a debt owed
by another. Other jurisdictions have more fully considered recovery for mental distress in the
debtor-creditor relationship. See, e.g., Delta Fin. Co. v. Ganakas, 93 Ga. App. 297, 91 S.E.2d
383 (1956) (creditor threatened child with imprisonment to gain admittance to apartment to
repossess television set); Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932)
(long series of threatening letters to collect debt); Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139,
150 So. 2d 154 (1963) (abusive language used against debtor's parents); LaSalle Extension
Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 427, 253 N.W. 424 (1934) (letters in psuedo-legal form threatened
legal action).
Louisiana and Texas have apparently created a separate tort for unreasonable collection
efforts; however, their courts have not specifically defined the tort. The activities of the
creditors involved in the suits are similar to those which courts in other states have classified
as wanton and outrageous conduct, and for which they permit recovery for mental distress.
For the Louisiana view see Pack v. Wise, 155 So. 2d 909 (La. App.), appeal denied, 245 La.
84, 157 So. 2d 231 (1963) (employer informed of debtor's default after debtor's attorney
notified creditor of asserted defense). See also Booty v. American Fin. Corp., 224 So. 2d 512
(La. App. 1969); Passman v. Commercial Credit Plan, 220 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 1969);
Boudreaux v. Allstate Fin. Corp., 217 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 1968); 38 TUL. L. REv. 591 (1964).
For the Texas approach see Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954)
(daily phone calls to debtor's home and place of employment; frequent letters and telegram
sent to debtor's neighbors, relatives, employer, and fellow employees). See also Phillips v.
Latham, 523 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Credit Plan Corp. v. Gentry, 516 S.W.2d 471
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Whatley v. K-Mart Discount Stores, 451 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970); Martin, A Creditor's Liability for Unreasonable Collection Efforts: The Evolution of a
Tort in Texas, 9 S. TEx. L.J. 127 (1967); Comment, Focus on Debtors' Rights-Making the
Bill Collector Pay, 23 KAN. L. REv. 681, 687 (1975); Comment, Recovery for Creditor
Harassment, 46 TEXAs L. REv. 950 (1968).
64. PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5504 (1973).
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kinds of anonymous phone calls involving lewd, lascivious, or inde-
cent language misdemeanors. 5 Since the debt collector usually
identifies himself and may not use vile language, this section is not
ordinarily available to protect the debtor. However, the statute also
prohibits repeated communications and those made at extremely
inconvenient hours. 6 This provision is a new addition to the prior
section,67 which was clearly intended to prevent anonymous and
obscene phone calls.6" While the new subsection may be helpful to
some harassed debtors, it is unclear whether it will be an effective
remedy. 9
2. Unauthorized Practice of Law
The unauthorized practice of law is also a misdemeanor. 0 This
criminal sanction is inapplicable to most debt collectors because the
creditor seldom represents that he is entitled to practice law; in-
stead, he may prey on the debtor's fear of subsequent legal action.
The debtor simply does not know what can or cannot legally be done
to him.7"
3. Unlawful Collection Agency Practices
Section 7311 of the criminal code72 makes certain collection
65. The statute provides that a person commits a third degree misdemeanor if, with intent
to harass, he calls another "without intent of legitimate communication or addresses to or
about such other person any lewd, lascivious or indecent words or language or anonymously
telephones another person repeatedly." Id. § 5504(a)(1).
66. Id. § 5504(a)(2).
67. The earlier provision stated:
Whoever telephones another person and addresses to or about such other person any
lewd, lascivious or indecent words, language, suggestion or proposal, or solicitation to
engage in fornication or any other immoral act, or whoever anonymously telephones
another person repeatedly for the purpose of annoying, molesting or harassing such
other person or his or her family, is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
Act of Sept. 9, 1965, No. 253, [1965] Laws of Pa. 498.
68. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mason, 456 Pa. 602, 322 A.2d 357 (1974).
69. Prosecutions under this statute have not involved collection activities, but cases do
suggest the difficulties of applying the subsection. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Houck, 233
Pa. Super. 512, 335 A.2d 389 (1975) (call saying victim should be thrown out of church is de
minimis infraction); Commonwealth v. Hahn, 70 Pa. D. & C.2d 79 (C.P. York Co. 1975) (no
prosecution for leaflet charging labor leader with sexual misconduct).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, 99 1608-10 (1962). Section 1608 forbids any person to practice
law, or to hold himself out to the public as being entitled to practice law, unless he has been
duly and regularly admitted to practice law.
71. See Berger, supra note 7.
72. PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7311 (1973).
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agency practices misdemeanors,73 perhaps in recognition of the fact
that while the debt collector may not actually represent himself as
practicing law, he may leave the debtor with the impression that the
collector can perform legal functions. A beneficial aspect of section
7311 is its prohibition of coercion or intimidation of the debtor by
the use of psuedo-legal forms and threatened legal proceedings, At
this writing, there were no reported cases to demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of the section.75
As with all criminal statutes, the problems of enforcement affect
the statutes discussed above. The aggrieved debtor might not know
that a law has been broken when he is the victim of unreasonable
creditor action. Even if he makes a private complaint, he faces the
task of convincing the proper authority to prosecute the creditor.
Since the infractions are merely third degree misdemeanors,76 the
prosecutor might conclude that the violations are de minimis.77
Finally, although the new Sentencing Code7" does permit restitution
as a penalty,7" criminal sanctions traditionally do not compensate
the victim.
73. Id. § 7311(g). Among its proscriptions, § 7311 prohibits the collection agency from
appearing for, or representing a creditor in any proceeding, and from buying or taking an
assignment of a creditor's claim for the purpose of collecting or enforcing payment of the
claim. In addition, it is unlawful for a collection agency to furnish legal services, or to
represent a debtor in a settlement or adjustment of his affairs. The section also forbids a
collection agency to solicit employment for attorneys. PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§
7311(a)-(e) (1973).
74. The section provides:
(1) It is unlawful for a collection agency to coerce or intimidate any debtor by
delivering or mailing any paper or document simulating, or intending to simulate, a
summons, warrant, writ, or court process as a means for the collection of a claim, or
to threaten legal proceedings against any debtor.
Id. § 7311(f)(1).
75. There are reported cases involving defendants who violated the statutory predecessor
of § 7311, Act of June 24, 1939, No. 375, § 895, [1939] Laws of Pa. 872, by simulating legal
processes to intimidate debtors. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tucker, 187 Pa. Super. 61, 142
A.2d 786 (1958); Commonwealth v. Axe, 51 Lanc. L.R. 359 (Pa. C.P. 1949).
76. For the penalties for conviction of a third degree misdemeanor see PA. CONSOL. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 1101(a) (Supp. 1976) and PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1104 (1973).
77. See PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 312 (1973).
78. PA. CONSOL . STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1301-82 (Supp. 1976).
79. Id. § 1321(c). In choosing among sentencing alternatives, the court is to be guided by
the principle that the sentence must be consistent with the "protection of the public, the
gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Id. § 1321(b). See also
id. §§ 1322-26.
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Ill. STATE DEBTOR PROTECTION STATUTES
Existing tort remedies and criminal sanctions do not adequately
safeguard the rights of the harassed debtor, despite the probable
expansion of actions for invasion of privacy and infliction of mental
distress. 0 The overall complexity and fractionalization of the tort
remedies and the limited effect of available criminal sanctions lead
to a proposal for specific statutory prevention of improper collection
practices, with effective remedies designed to protect the debtor as
well as to compensate him when necessary. Attempts to provide
statutory protection and relief have been undertaken in Pennsyl-
vania and other states. The majority of these attempts, however,
have been incomplete, and a review of them suggests comprehensive
legislation is necessary.
A. Pennsylvania's Consumer Protection Statutes
Even before the recent trend toward consumer protection laws,"'
the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted measures intended to
protect citizens from commercial abuses by those who could benefit
from their superior financial positions." Acts have been passed to
establish a system of state control and regulation to insure honest
and efficient use of the consumer's resources83 in the areas of con-
sumer loans,"4 sales of motor vehicles,85 retail installment con-
80. See Comment, Debt Collection, supra note 5, at 90-96.
81. See Comment, Consumer Protection in Pennsylvania, 30 U. Prrr. L. REv. 113 (1968).
82. The courts have interpreted the intent of measures such as the Small Loans Act, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6151-57 (1967), to be to protect the small and necessitous borrower. See
Ritter Fin. Co. v. Myers, 401 Pa. 467, 165 A.2d 246 (1960); Lackawanna Thrift & Loan Corp.
v. Kabatchnick, 145 Pa. Super. 52, 20 A.2d 903 (1941).
83. The policy expressed in the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69,
§§ 601-37 (1965), is typical:
[I]t is hereby declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to
promote the welfare of its inhabitants and to protect its citizens from abuses presently
existing . . . and to that end exercise the police power of the Commonwealth to bring
under the supervision of the Commonwealth all persons engaged in the business of
extending consumer credit . . to establish a system of regulation for the purpose of
insuring honest and efficient consumer credit service. . . and to provide the adminis-
trative machinery necessary for effective enforcement.
Id. § 602(d).
84. See, e.g., the Consumer Discount Company Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6201-19
(1967), as amended, Act of March 3, 1976, No. 17, [1976] Laws of Pa. __.
85. See the Motor Vehicles Sales Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-37 (1965).
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tracts, 86 retail advertising, 7 and home improvement sales. 8 The
Pennsylvania legislature has, however, failed to provide a definitive
statutory remedy for the harassed debtor. 9
B. Collection Agency Statutes
With the adoption of section 7311 of the Crimes Code, 0 Pennsyl-
vania took a limited first step toward controlling abusive tactics of
collection agencies. 1 However, section 7311 covers only one small
area of the problem-the use of techniques that mislead the debtor
about the legal status of actions being taken against him. 2 Other
states have taken stronger action. Some require that collection
agencies be licensed and bonded, and that they keep extensive re-
cords.13 Licensing itself does not necessarily provide any more pro-
86. See the Goods and Services Installment Sales Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 1101-
2303 (Supp. 1976). The Act regulates installment accounts and add-on accounts, and limits
interest and service charges.
87. See the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73,
H§ 201-1 to -9 (1971), which forbids deceptive advertising and pricing.
88. See the Home Improvement Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 500-101 to -602
(1971).
89. A bill regulating and providing penalties for unfair debt collection practices was
submitted to the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1973. Pa. House Bill 649, Printer's No.
3489 (March 26, 1973). The provisions of the bill were substantially the same as those of H.R.
10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), discussed at notes 121-61 and accompanying text infra;
the bill was similar in coverage to laws recently enacted by other states, discussed at notes
100-14 and accompanying text infra. Although the bill was passed by the House on January
22, 1974, and was approved in amended form by the Senate on September 24, 1974, the
measure died when the House failed to concur with the Senate amendments on October 1,
1974; HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS AND RESOLtrIONs- SEssIoNS OF 1973 AND 1974, at A-88 (1974).
This bill was reintroduced in 1975. Pa. House Bill 167, Printer's No. 3506 (Jan. 28, 1975).
Once the bill received final House approval, it was referred to the Senate and reported out of
Committee on June 7, 1976. It was again referred to Committee on June 22, 1976. Letter from
C.L. Schmitt, Chairman, House Consumer Protection Committee, to this writer, Sept. 8,
1976.
90. PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7311 (1973).
91. See notes 72-75 and accompanying text supra.
92. Similar provisions in other states forbidding the use of misleading notices and forms
include: IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-18-13-2 (1975); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-9-1 (1972); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 190.50 (McKinney 1975). A few states' provisions are limited to debt adjusting. See
MONT. REy. CODES ANN. §§ 18-401 to -03 (Supp. 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 425.010 (Supp.
1976); N.H. RaV. STAT. ANN. 399-D:1 (Supp. 1973); OHIO Rv. CODE ANN. §§ 4710.01-.02
(Anderson Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3411 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4861
(1971).
93. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 492 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 8.24.011 (1973); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 24 (1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.655 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. 45:18-1
(1963); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 13-05-02 to -07 (1971); ORE. RED. STAT. § 697.010 (1974); UTAH
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tection for the debtor, but at least it is one way to insure that
existing regulations are enforced.
Recently, other states have enacted extensive provisions designed
to curb unreasonable collection agency practices. 4 The collection
agency has been defined as any person, association, partnership, or
corporation which collects debts for compensation or other valuable
consideration. 5 While these measures exceed the protection offered
in Pennsylvania," they still fail in the sense that collection agencies
are not the only culprits of abusive collection practices. 7 One need
only recall that the defendant in Vogel was a department store
attempting to collect its own debts;9 8 the Vogel defendant might not
fall within the purview of this statutory definition. A redeeming
feature of these statutes, however, is their listing of prohibited prac-
tices. Common tactics which are forbidden include: advertising
claims for sale; using "deadbeat" lists; giving the impression of law
enforcement; using psuedo-legal forms; using abusive, profane, or
obscene language; and contacting the debtor's employer.' These
practices reflect methods actually used by the unethical collection
agency and therefore may offer some relief to the harassed debtor.
CODE ANN. § 12-1-1 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-729.3 (1974). Licensing is sometimes accompa-
nied by prohibition of creating the impression that the collection agency is authorized to
practice law. See, e.g., Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1051 (Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§ 42-131 (Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE § 26-2229A (Cum. Supp. 1976).
94. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6850-956 (West 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12-14-101 to -128 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 559.55-.78 (Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§§ 443-1 to -33 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §§ 801-15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 571-84 (Cum. Supp. 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 649.005-.435
(1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-15-22 to -89 (1974).
95. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 802.02 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976).
96. See notes 72-74 and accompanying text supra. Section 7311 only applies to the profes-
sional collection agency, or
[a) person, other than an attorney at law . . . who, as a business, enforces, collects,
settles, adjusts, or compromises claims, or holds himself out, or offers, as a business,
to enforce, collect, settle, adjust, or compromise claims.
PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7311(h) (1973).
97. See Comment, Debt Collection, supra note 5, at 88.
98. Other examples of non-collection agency offenders may be found in cases cited at
notes 54 & 63 supra.
99. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2008 (Supp. 1975); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6947
(West 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14-124 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 559.72 (Supp.
1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 443-41 to -45 (Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §§ 809-
.21 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 576 (Supp. 1973); NEV. REv.
STAT. § 649.375 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-15-78 (1974).
1976
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IV. DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACTS
As an alternative to reliance on either the traditional tort reme-
dies or the limited statutes described above, some states have
adopted comprehensive legislation designed to protect the debtor;
similar legislation is pending at the federal level. These statutes will
be reviewed, since they appear to offer the appropriate relief to the
debtor.
A. State Debt Collection Practices Acts
In contrast to the legislative response of most states to the
harassed debtor problem, Iowa, Maryland, Texas, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia have recently passed stat-
utes prohibiting all unfair debt collection practices. 00 These acts
apply to any debt collector, not just the professional collection
agency.' 0' Any person engaging directly or indirectly in debt collec-
tion, whether for himself, his employer, or others, may be affected, 02
including one who sells or offers forms represented to be a collection
scheme, device, or system intended to be used to collect debts.'03
The statutes are intended to give the debtor maximum protection
while they recognize the creditor's right to collect his money.'04'
In general, the acts prohibit a wide range of unethical conduct
and list illustrative examples of each kind of prohibited activity.
The broad categories of illegal practices regulated by the acts are
100. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3814 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 537.7101-.7103 (Supp.
1976); MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. Law Art., §§ 14-201 to -203 (1975); TEx. RV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
arts. 5069-11.01 to .11 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A-2-122 to -129 (1976); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 427.101-.105 (1974).
101. In contrast with § 7311(h), the provisions of Pa. House Bill 649 would apply to all
debt collectors, not only to professional collection agencies. The definition of a debt collector
in the Pennsylvania legislative proposal is similar to that found in the acts of other states.
See note 96 supra and text accompanying notes 102-04 infra.
102. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3814(b)(3) (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.7102(3) (Supp. 1976);
MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. Law Art., § 14-201(b) (1975); TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-
11.01(c) (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-122(c) (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 427.103(3)
(1974).
103. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3814(b)(3) (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.7102(3) (Supp. 1976);
Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.01(c) (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-122(c)
(1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 427.103 (1974).
104. For a general discussion of statutory safeguards for the interests of both creditor and
debtor see Jeffries, Protection for Consumers Against Unfair and Deceptive Business, 57
MARQ. L. Rv. 559 (1974); Scott & Strickland, Abusive Debt Collection-A Model Statute
for Virginia, 15 WM. & MAav L. REv. 567 (1974); Comment, Effectively Regulating Extrajudi-
cial Collection of Debts, 20 MAINE L. Rav. 261 (1968).
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threats of coercion;' 5 harassment or abuse;' 6 unreasonable public-
ity;'17 unfair and unconscionable means;'0 8 fraudulent, deceptive, or
misleading representations; ' " and violations of the United States
postal regulations."10 In some states the aggrieved debtor may re-
cover civil damages"' and attorney's fees"2 in addition to possible
criminal penalties available against the creditor."' These features
eliminate some of the drawbacks of the traditional criminal statutes
already discussed."'
B. The Federal Debt Collection Practices Act
In 1968, recognizing the important role that credit plays in our
national economy, the Congress of the United States passed the
Consumer Credit Protection Act."15 The purpose of the Act was to
insure that the consumer was aware of credit terms, used credit only
with knowledge, and avoided the misguided use of credit."' The Act
105. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3814(c) (1973); IowA CODE ANN. § 537.7103(1) (Supp. 1976);
MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. Law Art., §§ 14-202(1)-(3) (1975); TEx. Rov. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-11.02 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-124 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
427.104(1)(a)-(f) (1974).
106. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3814(d) (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.7103(2) (Supp. 1976);
MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. Law Art., §§ 14-202 (6)-(7) (1975); TEx. RED. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-11.03 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-125 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
427.104(1)(g)-(i) (1974).
107. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3814(e) (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.7103(3) (Supp. 1976);
MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. Law Art., §§ 14-202(3)-(5) (1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-126
(1976); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 427.104(e) (1974).
108. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3814(g) (1973); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.04
(Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-128 (1976).
109. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3814(f) (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.7103(3)(c)(4) (Supp.
1976); MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. Law Art., §§ 14-202(8)-(9) (1975); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 5069-11.05 (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-127 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
427.104(1)(j)-(1) (1974).
110. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3814(h); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.7103(6) (Supp. 1976); TEX. REv.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.05(m) (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2-129 (1976). These
provisions refer to federal regulations and laws, including 18 U.S.C.A. § 1463 (Supp. 1976)
(forbidding the appearance of "indecent matter"), and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1718 (Supp. 1976)
(forbidding the appearance of "libelous matter" on wrappers and envelopes).
111. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3814(j) (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.5201(1) (Supp. 1976); MD.
ANN. CODE, Comm. Law Art., § 14-203 (1975); TEx. R v. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.10
(Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5-101(1) (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 427.105 (1974).
112. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.10 (Supp. 1976).
113. IowA CODE ANN. § 537.5301 (Supp. 1976); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.09
(Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-5-103(4) (1976).
114. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-91 (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
116. Id. § 1601. See also Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 533 F.2d 102 (3d
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regulates credit terms, transactions and advertising;"7 billing"8 and
reporting;"' it proscribes discrimination in credit.' 0 On October 9,
1975, an amendment was proposed to the Consumer Credit Protec-
tion Act which would prohibit abusive collecting tactics of credi-
tors.'"' The proposed Debt Collection Practices Act'22 is substan-
tively similar to the state debt collection practices acts already ex-
amined.' 3 The bill provides an effective means of protecting the
consumer-debtor from unreasonable collection tactics.' 4 It would
forbid harassment,' 0 unlicensed practice of law,' 0 false and mis-
leading representations or impersonations,' 7 and other unfair prac-
tices. ' -The provisions of the proposed act would be enforced
Cir. 1976); Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975); Zeltzer
v. Carte Blanche Corp., 514 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir. 1975).
117. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-14, 1631-45, 1661-65(a) (1976).
118. Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666(a)-() (Supp. 1975).
119. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)-(5) (1971).
120. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691(a)-(e) (Supp. 1975).
121. H.R. 10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The act passed the House as H.R. 13720
on July 27, 1976; the Senate at this time has scheduled no action on the bill. Letter from
Frank Annunzio, Chairman of the U.S. House Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, to this
writer, Sept. 8, 1976.
122. H.R. 10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 822 (1975).
123. See notes 100-14 and accompanying text supra.
124. The proposed legislation, however, applies only to professional debt collectors. H.R.
10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 801(e) (1975). When he introduced the bill, Representative
Annunzio emphasized that the most flagrant offenders are collection agencies, rather than
private creditors, since "[d]ebt collectors are in the business solely to collect debts of others,
not to collect for products they sold or services they rendered." 121 CONG. REC. 5405 (daily
ed. Oct. 9, 1975) (remarks of Representative Annunzio). In view of the present inadequate
protection 'of the debtor, this definition seems too restrictive. See notes 96-98, 101-04 and
accompanying text supra.
125. The bill provides: "No debt collector may harass or intimidate a consumer in connec-
tion with the collection or attempted collection of any alleged debt arising from a consumer
credit transaction." H.R. 10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 802 (1975).
126. Specifically, the proposed legislation states: "No debt collector, not a licensed attor-
ney, may engage in the practice of law (as defined by the jurisdiction in which he is engaging
in such activity) in connection with the collection or attempted collection of any alleged
debt." Id. § 803.
127. The pertinent section states:
No debt collector may make any false or misleading representation, written or oral,
or engage in such practices or resort to any illegal means or methods of debt collection
including impersonation, in connection with the collection of an alleged debt. ...
Id. § 804.
128. According to the proposed measure, "[no debt collector may engage in unfair
practices in collecting or attempting to collect any alleged debt arising from a consumer credit
transaction." Id. § 805.
1976 Comments
through civil liability,' 9 private attorney general actions,' 30 and
criminal prosecution;'1' administrative enforcement by the Federal
Trade Commission is contemplated. 3 1 State laws which afford equal
or greater protection would remain in force after passage of the
bill. ,13
The major contribution of the bill would be its uniform attempt
to prohibit the debt collector' 34 from harassing and intimidating the
consumer.'3 Harassment is defined through a list of examples which
are not intended to be exhaustive.'36 Included on the list are prac-
129. The debt collector shall be liable for
(1) any actual damage . . . including any incidental, consequential, or spe-
cial damages...
(2)(A) not less than $100 nor more than $2,500 as determined by the court;
or
(3) in the case of any successful action . . the costs of the action, together
with a reasonable attorney's fee . . . . If the consumer is represented by a
nonprofit organization . . . the organization shall be awarded a service fee, in
lieu of an attorney's fee . . . ; and
(4) such amount of punitive damages as the court may allow.
(b) Upon proof of an intentional violation . . . such violation shall constitute a
complete defense . . . to any alleged debt out of which the violation arose.
(c) [Tihe appropriate United States district court may grant such equitable and
declaratory relief as is necessary ....
Id. § 811.
130. This section provides:
(a) [Any affected consumer, whether or not actually damaged, may bring a civil
action ....
(b) Any bona fide consumer protection organization, whether or not actually dam-
aged, may bring a civil action ....
(c) The person bringing an action under subsection (a) or (b) shall allege all such
courses of conduct by the person subject to the requirements of this title that are
claimed to be in violation and known to the person bringing the action. Such action
shall be brought in the name of and for the United States as well as for the private
plaintiff.
Id. § 812.
131. The bill provides that whoever wilfully and knowingly "fails to comply with any
requirement imposed under this title, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than one year or both." Id. § 814(2).
132. Id. §§ 816-17.
133. Id. § 819.
134. Reflecting the bill's limited coverage, the term "debt collector" refers to any person
engaged in collecting or attempting to collect a debt owed or asserted to be owed to another.
Id. § 801(e). See note 124 supra.
135. The bill applies only to "consumers," i.e., those whose indebtedness was created for
personal, family, or household purposes. H.R. 10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 801(c), (g)
(1975).
136. Id. § 802.
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tices which could be classified under the traditional torts discussed
earlier: 37 abuse of process, 3 defamation, 9 invasion of privacy,' 0
and infliction of mental distress.' The benefit to the consumer is
that he would no longer face the nearly impossible task of proving
the creditor's intent, motives, and unreasonableness required in the
common law tort actions. It would be sufficient for the consumer to
show that he was in fact harassed by the debt collector. Of course,
just as the fact finder previously had freedom in judging if the con-
duct was unreasonable or outrageous, under the proposed federal
statute the fact finder would assess the conduct to see if it meets
137. See notes 14-63 and accompanying text supra.
138. Section 802(10) prohibits "threatening a consumer with imprisonment for failure to
pay an alleged debt." Section 802(11) prohibits threatening that nonpayment of an alleged
debt will result in the arrest of the consumer, or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or
sale of any property or wages without a court order. H.R. 10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§
802(10)-(11) (1975).
139. The bill attempts to codify protection against defamatory statements or actions,
including the following:
(8) The false accusation or threat to accuse falsely or threat to file an action in
court falsely accusing any person of fraud or any other crime, or any conduct which
would tend to disgrace such other person, or in any way subject him to the ridicule or
contempt of society or his community;
(9) False accusations made to another person, including any credit reporting
agency, or the threat to so falsely accuse, that a consumer is willfully refusing to pay
a just debt;
(12) Disclosing or threatening to disclose information adversely affecting a con-
sumer's reputation for creditworthiness with knowledge the information is false.
Id. § 802.
140. Prohibited activities which might constitute invasion of privacy under common law
include: publishing or causing to be published "deadbeat lists," id. § 802(4); advertising, or
threatening to advertise, for sale a debt, id. § 802(5); bringing the existence of an alleged debt
to the attention of friends, neighbors, employer, or the family of the consumer, except the
consumer's spouse or attorney, id. § 802(14); using a form of communication with the debtor
that would ordinarily be seen by a person other than the debtor that conveys information
about the alleged debt, id. § 802(15); and making harassing or threatening phone calls or
visits to the home or place of employment of a consumer, id. § 802(16).
141. The common law tort of mental distress is reflected in statutory sections prohibiting:
the use or threatened use of violence or other criminal means to cause bodily harm to the
consumer, or harm to his reputation or property, id. § 802(1); the use of abusive language,
id. § 802(3); the use of "dunning letters" that simulate the legal process or are untrue,
abusive, or misleading, id. § 802(13). Other sections prohibit harassing or threatening phone
calls or visits to the consumer, or to his place of employment against his instructions, contact-
ing the consumer at home more than twice in every week, and attempting to contact him at
home early in the morning, late at night, or at other known inconvenient times. Id. §§ 802(16)-
(18). The creditor also is prohibited from communicating with the consumer after he has been
notified in writing that the consumer is represented by counsel. Id. § 802(19).
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the statutory definition of harassment.'"
In addition to codifying existing tort law, the act would protect
consumers from equally reprehensible, but more subtle tactics by
forbidding false and misleading representations, "1 3 and other unfair
commercial practices.' As with harassment, these practices are
proscribed through illustrative examples rather than by exhaustive
definition."' Thus the proposed legislation would provide additional
protection for the low-income consumer who may be most suscepti-
ble to misrepresentations and other abuses because he does not
know what his legal rights are, or because the creditor's conduct
may not easily be categorized as one of the traditional torts.", The
low-income consumer has been easy prey for the debt collector since
he is more prone to buy on credit and fall behind on payments."'
Under the act, the civil liability of the debt collector would be
tailored to adequately compensate the particular plaintiff. Possible
awards include compensatory damages," 8 punitive damages,"' and
attorney's fees;' s a judgment for the debtor may be a complete
defense to the debt.'5 ' These civil penalties permit the victimized,
aggrieved debtor to be made whole, unlike criminal sanctions.' 52
Criminal penalties would be allowed for intentional failure by the
creditor to comply with the law.' 3
The specific provision for private attorney general actions'5 ' would
142. Under the proposed legislation, one of the administrative tasks of the Federal Trade
Commission is the interpretation of the bill's specific prohibitions. See H.R. 10191, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 816-17 (1975).
143. Conduct prohibited as a misleading representation or impersonation includes: the
use of any badge or uniform giving the impression of association with a law enforcement
agency; using any psuedo-legal forms; misrepresenting the identity of the creditor or the debt
collector; misrepresenting the amount or nature of the debt; and misrepresenting the legal
processes available to the creditor. Id. § 804.
144. Examples of conduct labeled as unfair practices are obtaining waivers of the debtor's
legal rights; threatening any type of legal action which cannot in fact be taken; and soliciting
post-dated checks. Id. § 805.
145. The bill expressly provides that enumeration of violative conduct does not limit the
effect of the act to those activities which are listed. See id. § § 802-05.
146. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
147. See, e.g., Comment, Debt Collection, supra note 5, at 82.
148. H.R. 10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 811(a)(1)-(2) (1975). See note 129 supra.
149. H.R. 10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 811(a)(4) (1975). See note 129 supra.
150. H.R. 10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 811(a)(3) (1975). See note 129 supra.
151. H.R. 10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 811(b) (1975). See note 129 supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
153. H.R. 10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 814 (1975). For the text of the section see note
131 supra.
154. See note 130 supra.
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permit any consumer, whether injured or not, and any bona fide
consumer protection organization to bring an action against a debt
collector violating the act;15 this is a desirable feature. " It recog-
nizes that the consumer who is most harassed and intimidated by
the debt collector may be ignorant of his legal right to avoid such
harassment.' 7 The private attorney general provision also reduces
the problem of unenforced existing criminal statutes, "' since any
affected private citizen or consumer organization can bring a civil
action.
Jurisdiction for enforcing rights or liabilities under the act would
be in district court. 5 ' The Federal Trade Commission would be
given power to prescribe regulations to carry out the proposed provi-
sions of the act, and to explain and clarify it.160 The Commission
would determine through its regulations what conduct satisfies the
statutory definitions of harassment, misrepresentation, or unfair
practices. 6 '
The proposed legislation has been criticized for concentrating its
restrictions on the practices of professional debt collectors. Sponsors
of the bill argue that the professional debt collector needs to be
regulated and that laws already exist to control the practices of
other creditors. 112 However, this author suggests that the federal
legislation should follow the pattern of the state debt collection
practices acts; "3 its proscriptions should apply to all debt collection
efforts.
A more serious challenge is that the law would infringe upon a
state's right to fashion its own remedies and would overburden fed-
155. H.R. 10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 812 (1975).
156. Since the act specifically provides standing for affected consumers to demand its
enforcement, it would avoid the problem of a restrictive interpretation of standing to sue
applied by the courts. Cf. Kekich v. Travelers Indem. Co., 64 F.R.D. 660 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
See also Gard, Purpose and Promise Unfulfilled: A Different View of Private Enforcement
Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 274 (1975); Note, Implied Civil
Remedies for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 54 B.U.L. REV. 758
(1974). See generally Mooney, The Attorney General as Counsel for the Consumer: The
Oregon Experience, 54 ORE. L. REv. 117 (1975); Comment, Consumer Protection-A Private
Attorney General for Arizona Consumers, 219 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1975 (1975).
157. See Berger, supra note 7, at 329; Hearings, supra note 6, at 327.
158. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
159. H.R. 10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 811(f) (1975).
160. Id. §§ 816-17.
161. See notes 132, 136-45 and accompanying text supra.
162. See note 124 supra.
163. See notes 100-04 and accompanying text supra.
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eral courts with cases that should be within each state's jurisdiction.
The act, however, would not supercede state laws which afford equal
or greater protection to the consumer.' Although opponents of in-
creased federal authority may claim that the failure of state legisla-
tures to enact laws reflects sentiment disfavoring debtor protec-
tion,'65 Congress has relied on the commerce clause to enact the
Consumer Credit Protection Act,'66 and under the commerce clause
Congress has lawfully preempted state prerogatives in the interest
of national uniformity at other times."7 Moreover, congressional
enactment of uniform regulations which are not constrained by the
locality of the affected parties' residences or transactions would not
be illogical or unprecedented.I s To insure effective consumer pro-
tection, standards should be uniform and easily determinable; it has
already been demonstrated that the existing fragmented state laws
are insufficient for this purpose. Adoption of the Debt Collection
Practices Act by Congress is perhaps the best way to procure ade-
quate and uniform protection for the harassed debtor.
V. CONCLUSION
Comprehensive legislation, similar to that enacted by other states
and the federal bill pending in Congress, is essential to prevent
unethical collection techniques in Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, an
Unfair Debt Collection Practices Law,' 9 which included provisions
164. H.R. 10191, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 819-20 (1975).
165. For the legislative history of comprehensive debtor protection legislation in Pennsyl-
vania see note 89 supra.
166. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-91 (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
167. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-13, 1631-44, 1661-65 (1971), is within the power granted to Congress by the commerce
clause. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973). See 15 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REv. 394 (1973). For discussion of the preemption doctrine see Engdahl, Preemptive
Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. CoLo. L. REv. 51 (1973); Hirsch, Toward a New View of
Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515; Comment, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting
Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975).
168. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code proposed by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws is a prime example of developing sentiment for uniform
regulation in this area. See Copenhaver, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 71 W. VA. L.
REv. 1 (1968); LoPucki, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Consumer's Code-or Lender's
Code?, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 335 (1970); Malcolm, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 25 Bus.
LAW. 937 (1970); Miller & Warren, 1974 Uniform Consumer Code, 23 KAN. L. REv. 619 (1975);
Richter, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, 24 Bus. LAW. 183 (1968).
169. See note 89 supra.
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similar to the state and federal protective measures that have been
discussed, died in the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1974 be-
cause legislators could not agree on the final form of the bill. Al-
though the bill was reintroduced in 1975, it has not seen final Senate
action. Without passage of this or similar legislation, the Pennsyl-
vania debtor is practically left to suffer unreasonable collection
abuses unaided by the state.
Congress has already passed the Consumer Credit Protection Act
and the adoption of the proposed Debt Collection Practices Act is a
logical step in the development of comprehensive, consumer-
oriented legislation. Passage of the legislation would provide uni-
form control of creditor practices and guarantee protection to those
debtors whose states, like Pennsylvania, have not taken sufficient
action to protect their rights.
WILLIAM RICHARD CARROLL
